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by Larry B. Godwin
The concept of differential disclosure 
has been actively debated during the 
past several years. Differential dis­
closure is the reporting of different 
financial information to different users, 
on the theory that information has 
different degrees of utility for different 
user groups.1 The more detailed and 
technical disclosures are deemed ap­
propriate for the professional investor, 
while the less technical, more 
“understandable” disclosures are view­
ed as appropriate for nonprofessionals.
The concept of differential disclosure 
is currently operational with respect to 
periodic filings. The 10-K and 10-Q 
reports, required of companies 
registered with the Securities and Ex­
change Commission, are geared to the 
professional; annual and quarterly 
reports to stockholders are intended to 
serve the nonprofessional.
The Financial Analysts Federation 
recently released a report urging cor­
porate managements to exert more ef­
fort in the area of differential disclosure. 
The aim of such a disclosure policy was 
seen as the determination of the op­
timum body of information for a com­
pany to reveal, without overburdening 
the analysts or shareholders with too 
much data.2
In January, 1976, when he was Chief 
Accountant of the SEC, John Burton 
said that one of the “major thrusts” of 
the Commission in coming months 
would be differential disclosure. He 
challenged management to analytically 
select the “most important” disclosures 
and make them available to the “average 
investors,” while at the same time mak­
ing available to analysts the “kind of 
data they need to reach professional 
judgments about a company.3
At the same time, former SEC Chair­
man Roderick Hills announced the for­
mation of a new Advisory Committee 
on Corporate Disclosure to reassess all 
SEC disclosure policies and the Com­
mission’s methods of implementing 
them.4 In November, 1977, the Com­
mittee issued its final report to the SEC 
and surprised some by advocating the 
abandonment of the Commission’s 
existing differential disclosure policy. It 
suggested that public companies file 
with the SEC their annual and quarterly 
reports to shareholders in lieu of the 
currently required 10-K and 10-Q 
reports.5 In early 1978, the SEC ex­
pressed agreement with the committee’s 
suggestion, and said it would attempt 
later in the year to develop a single, com­
prehensive disclosure regulation com­
bining the annual report to stock­
holders and the 10-K report.6
Theoretically the concept of differen­
tial disclosure has great merit. The most 
compelling argument in favor of the 
concept is that the “average investor” 
has financial information needs that 
may well differ from those of the pro­
fessional analyst. Via differential dis­
closure, the needs of each class of users 
could be met without sacrificing the 
needs of other groups.7 In addition, no 
class of users would be subjected to in­
formation overload if accounting 
reports were tailored to the needs of 
each class.
The purpose of this paper is to present 
the findings of a research project aimed 
at determining the similarities and 
differences in the disclosure preferences 
of analysts and shareholders. In effect, 
the objective of the research was to 
evaluate the advisability of preparing 
separate accounting reports for each 
user group under the policy of differen­
tial disclosure.
Research Design and Methodology
In order to test the validity of the con­
cept of differential disclosure, a 
questionnaire approach was utilized.
The names of 298 of the approximate­
ly 5,000 members of the Financial 
Analysts Federation were selected from 
the organization’s Membership Direc­
tory, using a random numbers table. 
Members eligible for selection included 
industry specialists in 38 fields and per­
sons designated as “director of research” 
or “generalist.” Excluded from the pop­
ulation sampled were specialists in 
foreign securities, special situations, 
bonds and venture capital, as well as 
members who were economists, 
technicians, underwriters, investment 
counselors, portfolio managers, or who 
resided outside the United States.
The common stockholders of one 
large U.S. corporation whose stock is 
traded on the New York Stock Ex­
change were also chosen to participate 
in the study. The subject corporation is 
engaged in the mining and refinement of 
minerals and the sale of . mineral 
products; over 12,000,000 shares of 
common stock are outstanding. Exlud­
ed from the population sampled were 
officers, employees, and directors of the 
corporation; institutional investors 
(whose characteristics would, it was 
thought, approximate those of the 
analyst group); brokerage houses hold­
ing stock in street name; and persons 
located outside the United States. In 
total, 753 stockholders were selected for 
polling on a random basis.
Similar questionnaires were designed 
for administration to both the analysts 
and the stockholders. Twenty-five 
specific disclosures recently proposed or 
adopted by the SEC for the 10-K report 
and/or the annual stockholder report 
were listed in random order in the 
questionnaires. Only those disclosures 
which are general in nature, applicable 
to a wide variety of industries, appeared 
on the list.
Analysts were requested to indicate, 
for each disclosure, the usefulness in 
deciding whether or not to buy or 
recommend a company’s stock. Similar­
ly, stockholders were asked how useful 
each disclosure would be in deciding
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Analysts appear to be more 
concerned with quantitative 
disclosures: stockholders seem 
more interested in the 
company's image and the 
competence of management.
whether or not to buy or sell a com­
pany’s stock. In both cases, research 
participants were to indicate their 
responses by circling a number on a five- 
point scale on which zero represented 
“not useful” and four represented “very 
useful.”8
A “dummy” disclosure item, not ac­
tually proposed by the SEC, was includ­
ed among the legitimate disclosures in 
order to provide a rough gauge of the 
reliability of the research instrument. 
The text of the “dummy” item was: “A 
listing of the names of all common 
stockholders who own fewer than 100 
shares of the company’s stock at the end 
of the year.” It was thought that this dis­
closure would not be useful to the in­
vestment decisions of reasonable users.
The research was conducted in three 
stages. Questionnaires were pretested by 
administration to several relevant per­
sons, followed by discussion with them 
of the adequacy of the instruments. A 
pilot test was conducted through which 
the reliability and face validity of the 
questionnaires were determined to be 
sufficiently high, and the disclosure 
items were found to be worded suf­
ficiently clearly that the same in­
struments could be used for the primary 
study. A test for nonresponse bias was 
conducted and it was determined by 
application of the t-test that second- 
request responses did not differ 
significantly from those received in the 
initial survey. Usable responses were 
received from 127 analysts and 275 
stockholders, representing 42.6 and 36.5 
percent, respectively, of the question­
naires mailed.
Research Results
The data which emerged from the 
questionnaire study indicate that signifi­
cant differences (at the .05 percent level) 
in the perceived usefulness favoring one 
group or the other occurred for thirteen 
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of the twenty-five legitimate disclosures. 
The results of the chi-square test applied 
to the results show that in nine in­
stances, significantly more analysts and 
fewer stockholders found the disclosure 
items useful than expected, and in four 
cases, more stockholders and fewer 
analysts found the items useful than ex­
pected. For the remaining twelve dis­
closures, the results were mixed, i.e., 
they did not clearly favor one group 
over the other.
The disclosure items perceived as 
significantly more useful to the analyst 
respondents were-
Item9 Description
1 Book value of obsolete
equipment
2 Investment in loss division
3 Capital expenditure analysis
4 Available lines of credit
5 Short-term borrowing cost
6 CPA-auditor change




9 Tax rate difference
explanation
Disclosure items more useful to the 
stockholder respondents were:
Item Description
10 Political fund contributions
11 Attorney and CPA lawsuits




These results suggest that, where 
significant differences exist between the 
two groups, analysts may find dis­
closures that are quantitative in nature 
more useful than do stockholders. With 
the exception of disclosure of CPA- 
auditor change information (Item 6), 
the disclosures more useful to the 
analysts sampled dealt with dollars and 
percents. Indeed a majority of them 
(Items 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9) are aimed at 
adjusting the traditional financial 
statements in order to estimate a com­
pany’s value or recent progress, or to 
make the statements comparable to 
those of other companies. Items, 3, 4, 
and 5 may be useful in estimating a 
company’s future earnings.
On the other hand, three of the four 
disclosures viewed more useful by the 
stockholders polled (Items 10, 11, and 
13) are qualitative rather than quan­
titative in nature, i.e., they emphasize 
the integrity, quality and reputation of 
management and its activities rather 
than adjustments to the financial 
statements. Items 10 and 11 do include 
dollar figures, but the thrust of the dis­
closures seems to lie with the activities 
themselves rather than the amounts of 
money involved.
In summary, the results suggest that 
analysts as a group are more concerned 
than stockholders with analyzing 
current reported earnings and with es­
timating future earnings. In contrast, 
stockholders appear more interested 
than analysts in the basic competence of 
management and in the company’s im­
age. The implication may be that either 
(1) stockholders are more prone than 
analysts to make their investment 
decisions based on the quality of 
management and its activities, perhaps 
because, as a class, they possess a lower 
degree of financial sophistication to 
make adequate quantitative analyses 
from a company’s financial statements; 
or (2) stockholders rely primarily on 
analysts and brokers for their invest­
ment decisions, and their interest in the 
qualitative aspects of corporations 
merely acts as a constraint on the advice 
offered by others.
Another observation evident from the 
data is that analysts rated the disclosure 
items on a wider range of the scale than 
did stockholders. The median 
usefulness ratings of the analysts 
respondents ranged from .44 to 3.69; 
four medians fell below 2.00, the mid­
point in the scale. The stockholder 
medians varied from 1.79 to 3.56, and 
only one received a median below 2.00.
The results suggest that analysts, as a 
class, are more discriminating than 
stockholders in their ability to pick out 
from the list those disclosures which 
they view as irrelevant. Stockholders 
appear to advocate “disclosure for the 
sake of disclosure,” perhaps because of 
their belief that they have a right to 
know a great deal about the companies 
in which they own an interest. All the 
disclosures are viewed as at least 
moderately useful by the shareholders. 
This conclusion appears to be further 
substantiated by the fact that the stock­
holder sample found disclosure of the 
names of all shareholders who own 
fewer than one hundred shares of a com­
pany’s stock (the trivial “dummy” item, 
not actually proposed by the SEC) 
somewhat more useful than the analysts 
polled.
In order to gauge the degree of con-
sensus within each of the two groups, 
the mean absolute deviations relative to 
the usefulness medians were calculated. 
The deviations for analysts ranged from 
.60 to 1.18, whereas deviations for the 
stockholders were much greater and 
ranged from .94 to 1.42. These results 
suggest that, while the degree of consen­
sus for analysts is not great, the group is 
considerably more unified than the 
stockholder class. Analysts have a more 
common background than 
stockholders: they are all members of a 
professional organization; most of them 
engage in financial analysis as an oc­
cupation; and they are rather 
sophisticated in their knowledge of 
accounting terms and principles. 
Stockholders, on the other hand, 
probably vary considerably in their 
educational backgrounds, in the extent 
to which they do their own financial 
analysis, in their knowledge of business 
and accounting, and in their 
professional stature.
Summary of Research Findings
The results suggest that the two user 
groups may be differentiated along 
several lines. Analysts appear to be 
more concerned than stockholders with 
using quantitative disclosures aimed at 
analyzing current reported earnings and 
estimating future earnings. 
Stockholders, on the other hand, seem 
to be more interested in qualitative dis­
closures dealing with the company’s 
image and the competence of 
management.
Analysts seem to be better able than 
stockholders to distinguish the irrele­
vant information from a rather exten­
sive list of disclosures. Stockholders ap­
parently desire convenient access to 
large quantities of information, suggest­
ing “disclosure for the sake of dis­
closure” as a matter of principle.
Analysts as a group appear to be more 
homogeneous than stockholders. The 
degree of consensus among financial 
analysts concerning the usefulness of 
corporate disclosures seems to be 
significantly greater than for 
stockholders.
Conclusion
The limited scope of the research pro­
ject does not warrant sweeping 
generalizations. However, the survey 
results suggest that the SEC’s existing 
differential disclosure policy of requir­
ing extensive corporate disclosure in the 
10-K report, but a more limited degree 
of revelation in the annual stockholder 
report, is sound. Although stockholders 
indicate that they are moderately in­
terested in all the SEC’s disclosures, the 
research results seem to show that the 
interest on the part of the analysts is 
significantly greater for disclosures of 
the quantitative variety. Analysts, then, 
who appear more concerned than 
stockholders with disclosures such as 
the analysis of capital expenditures and 
the explanation of tax rate differences, 
should have available to them this type 
of information in the 10-K. Since 
analysts probably already have greater 
access to the 10-K report than do 
stockholders, it follows that the dis­
closures analysts perceive as significant­
ly more useful could be revealed via that 
source.
Qualitative disclosures, such as infor­
mation concerning attorney and CPA 
lawsuits and political fund con­
tributions, on the other hand, seem to 
have greater appeal to the stockholder 
group, and perhaps should be required 
for the corporate annual shareholder 
report. Such reports are made widely 
available to current and prospective in­
vestors, by brokerages houses as well as 
by the issuing corporations, and would 
seem to be a suitable medium for dis­
closures of the qualitative type.
However, stockholders as a class ap­
parently are not homogeneous. For­
tunately, the individual stockholders 
who desire a more complete revelation 
of data concerning companies in which 
they own an interest, including dis­
closures of a quantitative nature, do 
have access to the 10-K report. The SEC
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requires companies over which it has 
jurisdiction to furnish to stockholders, 
on request and without charge, a copy of 
its most recent 10-K report.
Therefore, by catering to the average 
stockholder through the annual 
stockholder report, yet providing the 
financial analyst and the sophisticated 
stockholder convenient access to 10-K 
data as well, the SEC’s current policy of 
differential diclosure seems optimal.
However, as reported earlier in this 
paper, the SEC intends to propose 
regulations which would develop a 
single, comprehensive disclosure policy 
combining the annual report to 
stockholders and the 10-K report. By 
abandoning its differential disclosure 
policy, the SEC appears to do a dis­
service to its registrant corporations, to 
their stockholders, and to financial 
analysts. Stockholder reports would 
presumably contain considerably more 
financial information under the new 
policy. Such reports, which will not con­
tain data that the analyst could not 
currently obtain via the 10-K report, will 
become more expensive to prepare and 
mail. In addition, the “average in­
vestor,” when presented with the greater 
quantities of data, may find it in­
creasingly difficult to isolate those areas 
which are most relevant to the decision 
processes. Both the stockholder and the 
analyst may be inhibited from making 
optimal decisions because of informa­
tion overload.
In sum, the research results seem to 
support the validity of the concept of 
differential disclosure. The SEC’s plan 
to combine the stockholder reports and 
statutory filings appears to be a step 
backward when the viewpoints of 
stockholders, analysts and the issuing 
corporations are considered.■
NOTES
1Clara C. Lelievre, “General Purpose Financial 
Statements,” The Woman CPA (July, 1977), p. 20.
2“Financial Analysts Cite Areas of Annual 
Report Deficiencies,” Journal of Accountancy 
(July, 1977), p. 20.
3“H ills Announces Reassessment of Disclosure 
at SEC Conference,” Journal of Accountancy 
(February, 1976), p. 28.
4Ibid., p. 27.
5“SEC Corporate Disclosure Group Issues 
Final Report,” Journal of Accountancy 
(December, 1977), p. 22.
6“SEC Acts On Recommendations of Dis­
closure Advisory Group,” Journal of Account­
ancy, (April, 1978), p. 12.
7Lelievre, op. cit., p. 21.
8The three intermediate numbers were not 
labeled.
9The disclosure items did not appear in this 
order on the questionnaire. The order was 
changed to facilitate discussion of the research 
results.
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